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which they wish to conduct his debate. Perhaps critics could argue that there is a 
difference between mathematical truth and the understanding of mathematics--that 
it is only our understanding of mathematical truths that is in need of refinement, 
not that mathematics i  "quasi-empirical." Surprisingly, the best refutation of La- 
katos and Koetsier may be from inside science itself, showing that Popper is shock- 
ingly mistaken, that science is really "risk analysis," that theories are never com- 
pletely falsified, or that some inductive vidence quals virtual certainty--traditional 
counterresponses designed to threaten Popper which may show that the falsifiability 
approach ultimately has little to do with mathematics. A traditional, realistic ap- 
proach to science may also damage the reliance by Lakatos and Koetsier on Kuhn 
and paradigm shifts. 
This is a well-written, clear, and easily comprehensible text, full of internal summa- 
ries and quite devoid of rigid technical language. While not a book for beginners, 
it has the singular advantages of simplicity and clarity, both highly relevant in 
producing ood argumentation. But two picky notes--first, here are a few misspell- 
ings that have escaped the editor and the author, a problem all too common in 
works targeted primarily at professional audiences, and, second, the text follows 
Webster's preferred "an historical" (for example, see p. 15). This makes the less 
preferable use of "a historical" in the title odd and inconsistent. Overall, I found 
the work to be thoughtful, very convincing, and a pleasure to read. I highly recom- 
mend this important book to anyone interested in the philosophy of mathematics, 
philosophical logic, and the history of mathematics. Koetsier is to be congratulated 
on a landmark contribution to the strangely sparse discussion of Lakatos' work 
and influence. 
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Jesseph's book naturally divides in two parts. The first is devoted to Berkeley's 
conception of geometry and arithmetic; its key is his rejection of abstract ideas and 
the theory that mathematical objects are abstracted from experience. It begins 
with a careful consideration of Berkeley's position against its background--in an 
extended sense, which goes from the role of abstraction i the philosophy of mathe- 
matics of the Aristotelian Scholastics, through the conceptions of such 17th-century 
mathematicians a  Barrow and Wallis, to the rejection of abstraction i the thought 
of Peter Browne, a teacher at Trinity College, Dublin, in the years when Berkeley 
was a student here. Having thus set the stage, the author proceeds to show the 
development ofBerkeley's philosophy of mathematics, from the initial stages, when 
he is concerned to refute abstractionism even at the price of rejecting classical 
geometry, to the reinterpretation f this latter in the Principles, to the final full 
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recovery of the classical standards of rigor and consistency in the attack against 
the calculus in the Analyst. He then presents Berkeley's nominalistic account of 
arithmetic in its historical context, and examines its connections with present- 
day formalism. 
In the second part of the book, Jesseph tackles Berkeley's criticism of the calculus. 
Again, his presentation of the problem starts with the background, that is, in 
this case, with a survey of the classical proofs by exhaustion, of the methods of 
"indivisibles" in Cavalieri and John Wallis, of Leibniz's differential calculus, and 
of Newtonian fluxions. There follows a careful consideration of the progress of 
Berkeley's ideas about infinites from the Philosophical Commentaries, through the 
Principles and the paper "Of Infinities," to the Analyst itself. The concluding chapter 
is devoted to the main responses to the Analyst. 
This is, as far as I know, the first book-length and complete study of Berkeley's 
philosophy of mathematics against its background. Many of the points tackled by 
Jesseph are now being widely discussed: there have been heated ebates on how 
aspects of Berkeley's philosophy of mathematics fit with his metaphysics, in particu- 
lar with his "instrumentalism," as well as critical treatments of Berkeley's attitude 
to the exact sciences, in particular geometry, and studies of the Analyst--of its 
background, of the controversy it caused, and of its influence in the history of 
mathematics. The names of such scholars as Mancosu, Blay, Guicciardini, Pycior, 
Sherry, and Cantor spring to mind. And yet, it is a fact that Berkeley's philosophy 
of mathematics a a whole has never been taken up as a subject for a complete 
study. At first sight, this may appear surprising: itseems uch an obviously interesting 
subject for a dissertation or a book, at once compact and varied, with a reasonable 
amount of fascinating background material already available and a reasonable 
amount still to be explored, and with a most attractive mixture of metaphysics and 
philosophy of mathematics, history of philosophy and history of mathematics. 
On reflection, however, it is precisely these features which make it a nearly 
impossible task. For instance, being at this fascinating crossroad between history 
and philosophy of mathematics obviously implies a constant tension. Moreover, 
both in the philosophy and in the history of mathematics the relationship between 
the current state of the discipline and its past history is difficult--in the case of 
philosophy, because the same piece of writing may be seen either as a theoretical 
contribution to discussion of present-day concerns, or as a product of a past time; 
in the case of the history of mathematics, because of the peculiarity of its objects, 
which makes it especially difficult o decide where the line is to be drawn between 
sound exegesis and unjustified anachronism. 
Of course, overcoming the difficulties I have sketched above, and writing a 
theoretically interesting book on the history of mathematics and philosophy of 
mathematics has its price in terms of historiography, and to some extent Jesseph 
pays it. For instance, he tends to transpose Berkeley's and his contemporaries' 
notations into modern terms. This is likely to make historians of philosophy and 
other historians of science, more concerned with respecting the past categories 
when talking about the past, feel rather unhappy. 
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But let us be less puritanical. Jesseph's book is a good, solid study, clearly resulting 
from intensive work on period texts. It is very careful, detailed and full of facts, 
and also of philosophical ideas--occasionally, not very typically 18th-century ones. 
It is certainly going to be a crucial work of reference on its topic for a long time. 
It would be ungenerous to criticize it because it pays a toll to the standards of at 
least two different, equally demanding disciplines. So let us thank Jesseph for 
having done this work, for having managed to be theoretically engaged while giving 
historians of mathematics grounds to feel reasonably happy; and let us enjoy reading 
his (re)construction f this mathematical-philosophical Berkeley with the curiosity 
and the respect it deserves. 
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The title of this book points to a plurality of mathematical worlds, and the 
indication is well supported by the book itself; virtually all of the essays are directed 
in one way or another to breaking up monolithic models of mathematical knowledge 
and replacing them with pluralistic visions. The replacements are as varied as the 
authors who formulated them; the essays are divided into three sections entitled 
"Philosophical Perspectives," "Mathematics, Politics and Pedagogy," and "Mathe- 
matics, Society and Social Change," and there is considerable play even within 
these broad delineations. None of the essays is long enough to be more than 
suggestive, but each provides apath into the relevant literatures in its bibliography. 
Although itself not a history book, this is essential reading for anyone in the 
process of framing a research project in the history of mathematics. Issues here 
considered often bear directly on the most fundamental ssumptions ofthe historical 
as well as the mathematical enterprise. Thus, to pick just one example, the process 
and implications of reflecting on mathematics i  a major concern in two essays, 
"The Dialogical Nature of Reflective Knowledge" by Ole Skovsmose and "Mathe- 
matics and Social Change" by Roland Fischer. Skovsmose takes off from a concern 
about the ways mathematical skills are used to create a hierarchy of ability among 
students to explore the "monological" epistemology that supports the peculiar 
dynamics of mathematical classrooms. A monological epistemology is one in which 
"the operations of the subject do not involve any interpersonal relations" (p. 167). 
Translated into the classroom setting, "monologism establishes authority in the 
classroom--the t acher and the text book" (p. 169); it also sustains the hierarchical 
rankings that clearly establish the relative worth of the students. Skovsmose counters 
this view of mathematics with a more diverse one; this entails uncoupling mathemati- 
cal knowledge from absolute truth, and connecting it to the more human notion 
